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The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment

and Free Exercise Jurisprudence
WILLIAM P MARSHALL*

INTRODUCTION

"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is
that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.", "'It is firmly
settled that . . the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
' 2
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." '
'
"[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric.

3

With such words the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that the

protection of the public from offensive commumcation does not constitute
a sufficient reason for proscribing expression. The reasons underlying this
rule are not esoteric. Powerful ideas are often offensive ideas. 4 Suppressing
ideas because they are offensive silences meamngful, provocative speech and
targets expression because of its content. Prohibiting offensive speech cuts
at the heart of the first amendment's central principle that ideas cannot be
proscribed because of their content. 5 Accordingly, it is no great surprise

* Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I am indebted
to Susan Bandes, Erwin Chemerinsky, Melvyn Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, John Garvey, David
Goldberger, Kevin McMunigal, Richard Myers, Sheldon Nahmod, Stephen Siegel and Geoffrey
Stone for their helpful comments and ideas. Exceptional research assistance and support were
provided by Francine Stulac and Ellie Ettinger.
1. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989).
2. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
3. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
4. As Justice Holmes stated, "Every idea is an incitement." Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980); Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 23-26 (1975); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV 113 (1981); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimmation, 68 VA. L. Rv 203 (1982); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Stone, Restrictions
of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
Cm. L. REv. 81 (1978).
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that the right to engage in offensive expression is one of the most strongly
6
protected individual liberties.
The concern with offensiveness in constitutional law is not, however,
limited solely to the speech clause. Depending upon how offense is defined,
offensiveness issues may also arise in due process, 7 equal protection s and
justiciability jurisprudence. 9 Religion clause jurisprudence, however, presents
issues of offensiveness that most closely parallel the offensiveness addressed
in speech clause analysis. The establishment clause claim that governmental
use of a religious symbol improperly endorses religion is, at least in part,
a claim that the religious symbol offends non-adherents to the favored
religion. The claim that reading state-required educational matenal violates
the free exercise rights of students and parents' 0 is, at least in part, predicated
upon the contention that these materials are offensive to the students'
religious beliefs.
In this Article, I examine the offensiveness element in current establishment and free exercise doctrines from the perspective of the offensive speech
doctrine. I do not enter into the current debate as to whether the stringent
protection allocated to offensive speech is justified." I assume the validity

6. The commitment to protecting offensive speech is so basic to first amendment principles
that it extends beyond protecting only the substance of that speech. It also extends to the
form of that speech. Recognizing that the manner of speech may be inextricably bound with
the message asserted, the Court has steadfastly protected forms of expression-even when
those forms are vulgar or profane. See, e.g., Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay
on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California,
1980 DUKE L.J. 283. According to the Court, the wide open and robust debate envisioned in
the first amendment necessarily means that there may be dissent and cacophony that is often
at odds with more genteel sensibilities. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
7. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship,
39 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 433-43 (1987) (arguing that concern for individual dignity underlies
procedural due process requirements); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden
of Proof in Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 18 (1988)
(addressing whether substantive due process rights are violated when the government restricts
reproductive options because of a fear of offense to community morality).
8. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the equal protection clause
protects against the government stigmatizing racial minorities).
9. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (holding stigma is not a sufficient injury to
satisfy article III case or controversy requirements).
10. After Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990),
this claim should probably be referred to as a "hybrid" due process/free exercise claim. See
infra note 20.
11. The protection of offensive expression has been seriously criticized. It has been argued
that such protection promotes a radical individualism that is, in the end, destructive to the
"public discourse" that the first amendment was designed to promote. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv L. REv 603, 684-86 (1990). It has also been criticized as
promoting a jurisprudence that is insensitive to the rights of those who are too often victims
of offensive statements. See Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REv 133 (1982); Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv 2320 (1989).
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of current speech doctrine as a starting point. Part I of this Article identifies
the offensiveness components within establishment and free exercise analysis.
Part II compares the Court's treatment of offensiveness under the religion
clauses with its treatment of offensiveness in speech doctrine and includes,
in this comparison, reference to both the speech doctrine's stringent protection of offensive expression and its implicit demand that listeners be
open-minded and tolerant. 2 Part III briefly discusses the implications of
applying the speech clause understanding of offensiveness to religion clause
issues.
I conclude that the infusion of an offensiveness component into religion
clause jurisprudence is inappropriate and should be eliminated. In establishment and free exercise matters, as well as in speech, commumcation should
not be inhibited out of deference to listener sensibilities. This conclusion,
it should be emphasized, does not mean that those governmental actions in
which offensiveness issues have arisen should be considered immune from
constitutional attack. Other cognizable establishment arguments can be
levied against the government's display of a symbol beyond the contention
that the display is offensive.' The claim that the symbol improperly endorses
religion need not depend on the premise that those not endorsed are
offended; endorsement may be seen as improper in and of itself without
regard to the sensibilities of outsiders.' 4 Offensiveness is also not the only
constitutional allegation that may be maintained against the required reading
of textbooks in the public schools. There are, for example, constitutional
limitations on requiring the religious adherent to profess principles antagomstic to her religious beliefs. 5 Simply put, governmental action should
not violate the religion clauses solely because it is offensive.
Before proceeding, however, one definitional obstacle needs to be addressed. The concept of offense is extremely hard to define. For example,
Joel Feinberg's leading philosophical work on the subject described offense

Finally, it has been argued that certain types of offensive speech such as epithets are merely
forms of communication and are not ideas. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 5, at 24344.
For particularly strong defenses of the offensive speech principle, see Farber, supra note 5;
Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for Suppressing
Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. (1991) (forthcoming).
12. See L. BOLLINGER, TRE TOLERANT SocITY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH
IN AMERicA 104-44 (1989).
13. Such claims might include sect preference; see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982),
or improper subsidy, cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
14. For a discussion of the establishment issues surrounding symbolic endorsement of
religion by government, see Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S.CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986) [hereinafter Marshall, Establishment]. See
also infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
15. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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as essentially a "disliked mental state."' 6 Beyond this, he defines offense
only by example, listing the "mental states it induces," such as disgust,
shame, hurt or anxiety I7For purposes of this analysis, I define offense as
an "affront to sensibilities," a definition which essentially conveys the use
8
of the term as it has appeared in speech cases.

I.

THE OFFENSIVENESS COMPONENT IN RELIGION CLAUSE DOCTRINE

Offensiveness does not expressly play a role in current religion clause
jurisprudence. Neither the Court's current establishment test nor its free
exercise test explicitly mentions offense as a relevant factor. The Court's
establishment clause test simply requires that governmental action must: (1)
have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion and (3) not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.' 9 The free exercise test, as it pertains to claims of governmental
interference with the rights of parents to direct their children's education, 20
asks whether free exercise rights have been burdened and, if so, whether
that burden may be overcome by a compelling state interest. 21
Despite no explicit mention of offensiveness in these two tests, offensiveness
has nonetheless worked its way into both inquines. Current establishment

16. J. FEINBERG, OMNSE TO OTms (1985) (volume two of a four-volume set entitled
The Moral Limits of the CriminalLaw).
17 Id. There are, of course, problems with Feinberg's definition beyond its lack of
precision. Feinberg attempts to distinguish offense from harm on the ground that harm involves
an invasion of an interest in which one has a stake, while offense involves no such invasion.
The problem with this position, however, is that all psychic harms cannot be easily distinguished
from other types of invasion. A severe emotional harm can affect an individual as much as a
physical injury.
18. See Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9
HAsv C.R.-C.L. L. REv 1, 2 (1974). Because this Article only compares degrees of offensiveness, a more precise definition of "offense" is unnecessary.
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
20. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600
(1990), the Supreme Court held that the compelling interest test would not apply to free
exercise claims seeking exemption from neutral laws of general applicability unless those laws
implicated the right of parents to direct the education of their children. Thus, under Smith,
the compelling interest test appears to remain valid with respect to the public school curricula
cases that are the subject of this Article.
Interestingly, however, the Smith Court characterized the constitutional interest at stake not
as free exercise but as involving a "hybrid" due process/free exercise right. Id. at 1601. The
Smith Court explained that Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which exempted the
Amish from compulsory education requirements, had rested on this "hybrid" interest. The
use of the term "hybrid," however, is strangely absent from the Yoder decision itself, and
many of us in academia were surprised to learn that Yoder was not truly a free exercise case.
To be fair, it should be noted that Smith did not directly overrule Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and the other conditional benefits cases granting exemption from neutral
unemployment compensation eligibility requirements to religious adherents. Smith's approval
of those cases, however, was somewhat less than enthusiastic. See Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 160203.
21. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
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clause analysis assumes that one of the essential establishment clause concerns is the prohibition of governmental endorsement of religion.2 This
analysis, while supported by sound considerations,2 largely turns upon how
endorsement is perceived. It is at this point that the offensiveness notion
has entered into the establishment equation. Leapfrogging from the premise
that establishment is a function of perception, various Justices have asserted
that the purpose of the endorsement inquiry is to protect the sensibilities
of the perceiver. Specifically, these Justices have argued that the prohibition
against endorsement is based upon protecting non-adherents from feeling
like outsiders.24 The claim that one is alienated from the governmental
display of a religious symbol, however, is in part a claim that one is
offended by that display.Y Justice Stevens has asserted this point explicitly.
In arguing that the public display of religious symbols should be presumptively illegal, he has maintained: "There is always a risk that such symbols
will offend nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents
' 26
who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful.
Offensiveness enters into the free exercise analysis as part of the inquiry
into burden. The question is whether governmental action that offends a
religious belief can be construed as an infnngement on religious exercise,
thereby triggenng the protection of the free exercise clause. Claims of this
type have most frequently been raised in the public school context. 27 In

22. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concumng).
O'Connor's concern with endorsement was picked up by the majority of Justices. in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3102 (1989).
23. The virtues of the endorsement inquiry may be quickly summarized. First, it reflects
the prominent role symbolism has in both government and religion and the "highly charged
atmosphere" that develops when the two are intertwined. Second, its ambiguity reflects the
apparently arbitrary pattern in which establishment violations develop. For example, most
would assume that the inclusion of a motorist's prayer on a state highway map is an
establishment violation and that a property tax exemption for religiously-owned property is
not. However, the actual aid given to religion in the first example is probably nonexistent,
while the aid given to religion in the second example accounts for over four billion dollars a
year. Third, the endorsement inquiry absorbs the inevitable tensions that occur in the relationship between church and state. Factors such as the permanent place of religion in the
nation's cultural heritage and the legitimate state and constitutional concerns with protection
of religious exercise simply make it impossible to create any bnght line tests. See Marshall,
Establishment, supra note 14, at 531-33 (quoting Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols,
46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1293 (1937)).
24. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102; id. at 3118 (O'Connor, J., concurrng in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 3131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The endorsement inquiry also examines whether adherents to the endorsed religion are
led to feel like a favored group. Id. at 3118.
25. See Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and DoctrnalIllusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. Rnv. 266, 309-13 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, Symbols].
The suggestion that the claim of alienation reflects a more profound injury than simply an
offense to sensibilities will be discussed infra at notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
26. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. This is the one area in which free exercise claims for exemption from generally applicable
laws appear to have retained some vitality. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
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these cases, claimants have argued that certain public school curricula
requirements violate the free exercise rights of students and their parents
by mandating readings from textbooks that are ostensibly antagonistic to
the claimants' religious principles. 28 Unless the claim is that the students'
religious tenets forbade them from reading these works, 29 the claim of
offense is implicit. The readings were allegedly unconstitutional because
they offended the students' and their parents' religious sensibilities.30
This treatment of offense to sensibilities in the religion clause cases raises
two immediate issues. First, is the offense at issue in these cases similar to
the type of offense that is the subject of speech doctrine? And second, if
so, is the treatment of offense in the religion clause cases consistent with
its treatment under the speech clause? Both issues are addressed in Part II.
II.

THE TREATMENT OF OFFENSE IN SPEECH AND RELIGION CLAUSE

DOCTRINE:

A.

A COMPARISON

The Establishment Clause

The comparison between the treatment of offense in establishment clause
jurisprudence and its treatment in speech clause doctrine may be introduced
by reference to two of the most controversial cases decided by the Supreme
Court in the 1988 Term: Texas v Johnson" and County of Allegheny v
American Civil Liberties Union.3 2 Both cases involved symbols. In Johnson,
the Court held that a statute prohibiting the desecration of the American
flag was unconstitutional under the speech clause. 33 The Court predicated
its decision, in relevant part, on the premise that the state could not proscribe
expressive activity solely because that activity might offend those observing
34
the event.
Twelve days later, the Court in Allegheny held that the government
violated the establishment clause by displaying a creche depicting the Christian nativity scene. The Allegheny opinion, though badly fragmented, also

28. See supra note 20.
29. The case in which the party has a religious duty to not read the objectionable text will
be addressed infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
31. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
32. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
33. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533; see also United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990)
(striking down a federal statute proscribing flag desecration).
34. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2544-45. Also at issue in Johnson was the state's claim that its
interest in preserving a national symbol overrode any competing first amendment rights. The
Court rejected this claim as well, sparking impassioned dissents from Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Stevens. Id. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2555 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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addressed the reaction of observers. Some of the Justices expressed concern
that non-Christians might feel alienated by
observing a governmental display
35
that endorsed Christian religious beliefs.
A closer analysis of this "affront to the observer" theme reveals an
interesting comparison between the two cases. Both address the problem of
protecting people from psychic harm. Assuming, for the moment, that the
psychic harms in the two cases are similar,3 6 the reasomng m the decisions
appears inconsistent. Allegheny's contention that the Constitution protects
observers from symbolic alienation conflicts with Johnson's conclusion that
the Constitution prevents the state from protecting individuals from offense.
Indeed, in Johnson, protection from psychic harm failed to rise to a level
of compelling state interest, much less a constitutional mandate.
Nevertheless, the differences between the two cases seem so apparent that
to many readers, undoubtedly, even the mere attempt to compare the two
may seem misconceved.3 7 First, any offense in Johnson stems from an
expressive act of a private person. On the other hand, the alienation
addressed in Allegheny results from an expressive act of the state. Second,
an observer's political or patriotic sensibilities are ostensibly at risk in
Johnson, whereas Allegheny involved potential offense to religious beliefs.
Third, the types of "offense" in the two cases are arguably qualitatively
different. The alienation of the non-adherent in Allegheny differs substantially from the offense at issue in Johnson. While the offense in Johnson
pertains solely to the sensibilities of the observer, it might be contended
that the offense in Allegheny stigmatizes an entire class-those who are
non-Christians.
All of these distinctions, however, are not as persuasive as they might
initially appear.3"

35. See, e.g., Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102; id. at 3118 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 3131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
36. Whether the harms are similar will be discussed infra notes 72-88 and accompanying
text.
37. The cases, of course, are readily distinguishable since the establishment clause applies
only to the state and does not proscribe private speech. That distinction, however, is not one
based on offensiveness grounds. See infra nqtes 52-53 and accompanying text.
38. A fourth possible distinction between these two cases is that those offended in Johnson
would likely be a political majority while those offended in Allegheny would likely be a
minority. This particular distinction, however, is grounded solely on the facts of each case.
The offensive speech doctnne protects speech considered offensive to minorities as well as
majorities. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978) (protecting racist and anti-semitic speech). The establishment clause prohibits governmental advancement of minority as well as majority religions. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curam) (teaching of transcendental meditation practices prohibited
in public school).
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1. The State/Private Party Distinction
There exists some intuitive appeal to the contention that offense caused
by government is qualitatively different from offense caused by a private
party. Intuition suggests that it is particularly egregious for individuals to
feel alienated by the very institution that is supposed to represent them.39
Intuition aside, however, one cannot easily maintain the assertion that
offensive governmental action is unconstitutional. Much of what the government does is offensive. 40 For example, the decisions to invade Panama,
use fluoridated water, trade with South Africa or fund abortion may be
deeply offensive to many, yet these actions do not raise constitutional
41
concern (at least not on offensiveness grounds).
The government's choice to speak (as well as act) in favor of these or
other controversial positions also does not raise constitutional concern. The
Court has yet to recognize any constitutional limits upon governmental
speech. 42 Commentators, as well, have universally recognized that the government must take positions on highly controversial issues. 43 Even those
who argue in favor of restricting governmental speech do not contend that
those limitations should be carved out on offensiveness grounds.4
A narrower argument that the state is prohibited from utilizing offensive
symbols is also not persuasive. Outside the establishment area, the state's
use of controversial symbols does not give rise to constitutional concern no

39. Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action, and the Allocation of Responsibility for
Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CoRNELL L. REv 1053 (1990).
40. This may be the most indisputable proposition ever set forth in a law review article.
41. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 826 (1985); Smith, Symbols, supra note 25, at 310.
42. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987); Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?,
35 STAN. L. REv 373, 376 (1983) ("courts consider government commumcations to be a
function of the state that is not constrained by the limitations of the first amendment"). But
see Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver School Dist., 459 F Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo.
1978) (publicly financed opposition to an amendment of a state constitution contravenes the
meaning of the first amendment).
43. See M. YUDos,

WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: PoLrrIcs, LAW AND GOVERNMENT Ex-

AmERICA 42-43 (1983) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per
curiam)) (The democratic character must be nurtured by the government; the government
provides information to its citizenry and thus "increase[s] the citizens' 'ability
to make
informed choices.'"); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv 565 (1980):
Government has legitimate interests in informing, in educating, and in persuading.
If government is to secure cooperation in implementing its programs, if it is to
be able to maintain a dialogue with its citizens about their needs and the extent
to which government can or should meet those needs, government must be able
to communicate. An approach that would invalidate all controversial governmental speech would seriously impair the democratic process.
Id. at 606 (footnote omitted). See generally J. TussmAN, GOVERNMENT AND rH MIN (1977)
(discussing how democratic governments inform voters).
44. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 43, at 622-26 (advocating restrictions on governmental
subsidies that influence elections).
PREssIoN iN
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matter how offensive those symbols mght be. Governments erect monuments to war without regard to the sensibilities of pacifists. A number of
states continue to incorporate Confederate symbols in their flags and public
buildings, even though the symbol of the Confederacy is an obvious affront
to blacks.41 Memorials, dedicated to the Unknown Child, may offend the
sensibilities of pro-choice advocates.4 All of this occurs without running
afoul of the Constitution.
Even the decisions that have vindicated the rights of those whose consciences would be compromised by having to engage in state-required
symbolic tribute do not hold that the governmental tribute itself was
unconstitutional. In these cases, the Court has simply granted the conscientious objectors the right to abstain from the symbolic tribute that they
found personally repugnant. For example, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,47 the Court held that student objectors could refuse
to salute the flag. The Court did not require that the flag salute be
terminated even though the objectors rmght very well still be offended.
Similarly, Wooley v. Maynard48 held that a Jehovah's Witness could block
out the state motto "Live Free or Die" on his license plate. Wooley did
not hold that the state was prohibited from placing the motto on its other
license plates, although the motto could, presumably; offend some observers.
In short, while some constitutional protections may exist for those compelled
to express state-sponsored ideas, no protection exists on offensiveness grounds
for those who are merely listeners or observers of the governmental expression.
A final argument might be that governmental speech is distinguishable
from private expression because only private expression is constitutionally
protected. In the private expression cases, the right to offend prevails over
the right not to be offended because a first amendment right is at stake.
In governmental speech cases, on the other hand, no first amendment
interest exists and the right of the listener to be*free from offense arguably
might prevail. This argument, however, improperly assumes that citizens
have a right to be free from governmental offense. As noted previously,
this assumption lacks merit. 49 Exposure to governmental offense is inevitable.
The decisions not to invade Panama, use fluoridated water, trade with
South Africa or fund abortion may also be offensive to certain individuals. 0

45. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (1lth Cir. 1990).
46. See generally Fausto v. Diamond, 589 F Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984) (the continuous

display, maintenance and preservation of a memorial to the Unknown Child does not violate
the establishment clause).
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
48. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
49. Indeed, if Dean Bollinger is right, the Constitution may impose a burden of being
exposed to offense. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.

50. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, this argument substantially understates the importance of governmental speech. Even if the government has no right to speak in the
individual liberties sense, an effective government must be allowed to take
positions on specific issues. Removing the government's authority to speak,
therefore, would interfere with the government's exercise of its powers under
articles I, II and III of the Constitution.-" Simply put, a government that
cannot "speak" cannot function.
Still, the distinction between governmental and private expression is
dispositive in at least one sense. The establishment clause only addresses
governmental speech, not private speech. The point of the preceding discussion, however, is that the significance of the establishment clause restriction on governmental speech cannot be explained solely on offensiveness
grounds. The establishment clause may prohibit the government from en53
dorsing the validity of religious tenets52 or adopting a religious position,
but, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, the reason for this prohibition
does not include a constitutional concern with governmental offense to
individual sensibilities. Rather, if the government's endorsement of religion
violates the Constitution, it does so independent of any offense it causes
its audience.
2.

The Religious/Non-Religious Sensibility Distinction
I

The contention that Johnson and Allegheny do not conflict because of
differences in the types of sensibilities involved is not persuasive. Joel
Feinberg, for example, groups "shock to moral, religious, or patriotic
sensibilities" as one category of offense. 54 Femberg's conclusion seems correct. It is difficult to distinguish qualitatively between the effects the burning
of an American flag, the desecration of a church, the burning of a cross or
the display of a Nazi swastika may have on individual sensibilities. 5 There

51. See generally M. YuDoF, supra note 43, at 38-50.
52. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679

(1871).
53. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
54. J. FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 11-12. Feinberg defines this category as "higher level"
sensibilities. Id. at 16. Offense to this type of sensibility involves transgressions of certain
principles rather than acts that simply disgust or repulse. Id.
55. Feinberg's discussion, grouping harm to moral, patriotic and religious sensibilities in
one category, occurs primarily with respect to his discussion of what he terms the "nuisance"
offense or the type of offense that harms observers. He does not, however, distinguish between
religious and other "higher level" sensibilities in his account of the "profound offense" or
the type of offense that may occur in the absence of an observer. Feinberg uses examples of
affronts to both moral and religious sensibilities to illustrate profound offense. J. FEINBRo,
supra note 16, at 50-60.
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is little to suggest that religious sensibilities merit constitutional treatment
different from political, moral or social sentiments.5 6
Nevertheless, even if religious sensibilities are philosophically or psvchologically similar to moral or patriotic sensibilities, it mght be argued that
the Constitution creates a religious distinction. Thus, the first amendment

could be read as addressing only religious offense17 in the same manner in
58
which it addresses only religious establishment.
Several problems exist, however, with the proposition that the first
amendment demands special consideration for religious sensibilities. First,
governmental attempts to provide such protection have been held unconstitutional under the speech clause. For example, m one well-known speech
case, Cantwell v. Connecticut,5 9 the prosecution was based in part on the
fact that the defendant's virulently anti-Catholic message, played on a
phonograph record in a predominately Catholic neighborhood, deeply offended its hearers. 60 The Court held that the state's attempt to prosecute
the defendant violated the first amendment, notwithstanding the religious.

sensibilities of the hearers. 6' In language that may very well have anticipated

56. An argument asserting that religious beliefs may be unique has been asserted recently
by Professor Daniel Conkle. Conkle argues that religious beliefs play a particularly important
role in an individual's conception of self. According to Conkle, this role makes an individual's
religious beliefs both strong and fragile. "They are strong because they are deeply embedded
in the person's self. They are fragile for essentially the same reason. Although a person can
ignore-brush off-certain types of insults, he cannot easily ignore a challenge to his selfidentity." Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. Rnv.
1115, 1165 (1988). For these reasons, Conkle advocates that religious beliefs (and by this I
assume he would mean religious sensibilities) are "entitled to special respect and special
protection." Id. at 1166.
As Conkle acknowledges, however, the protection of matters essential to self-identity does
not categorically distinguish religious from moral, philosophical, or political sensibilities.
Religious beliefs are not the only types of beliefs that may be critical to one's self-identity;
and, as Conkle admits, certain nonreligious beliefs "might stand in a similar posture" to
religious beliefs. Id. at 1166 n.208. Conkle's solution is to expand the meaning of religion to
incorporate nonreligious beliefs. Id. Thus, Conkle does not argue that only religious sensibilities
should be protected, and he ultimately rests his position on protecting all beliefs essential to
self-identity.
Conkle's solution cures the problem that it would be extraordinarily difficult to discern
when the particular offense felt by an individual is to her religious or to her philosophical or
moral sensibilities. Inquiries into the definition of religion and the sincerity of purported
religious views have proved elusive enough, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems of
Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv L. Rav. 933, 953-60 (1989), and as
Professor Stanley Ingber and others have noted, these inquines pose their own threat to
religious values. See, e.g., Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarificationof the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. Rv. 233, 241 (1989) ("To define religion is to limit it."). It only
exacerbates the problem, however, that affronts to sensibilities cannot be avoided in a diverse
society.
57. Cf. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555.
58. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per cunam). But see Kamenshine,
The FirstAmendment's Implied PoliticalEstablishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv 1104 (1979).
59. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
60. Id. at 302-03.
61. Id. at 307-11.
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62
the famous "one man's lyric" aphorism of Cohen v. Californa,
the Court
maintained, "In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
6' 3
rankest error to his neighbor.
A decade later, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v Wilson, 4 the Court held that
a statute which prohibited the showing of sacrilegious motion pictures
violated the first amendment. As the Court stated:

[T]he state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions
from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior
restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of
government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a
particular religious doctrine, whether they appear m publications, speeches,
or motion pictures.6
The message of Cantwell and Burstyn is clear. 66 The first amendment's
speech clause prohibits the state from acting to protect religious sensibilities.
At the very least, it would be inconsistent for the first amendment's
establishment clause to simultaneously require that religious sensibilities be
protected. 67
In any event, the conclusion that the protection of religious sensibilities
is not sufficient grounds to quell expression makes eminent sense apart from
speech clause precedent. In a diverse culture, affront to religious sensibilities
is unavoidable.68 Society's complexity alone may adversely affect religious
69
commitment.
Even more unfortunately, some alienation of religious minorities will
occur in any society that has a predominant religious tradition. As Professor
Steven Smith has noted, "[T]he fact that citizens may sometimes 'feel like
outsiders,' however unfortunate, does not provide a secure doctnnal foundation for the protection either of belief and expression generally or of

62. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[Olne man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
63. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
64. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
65. Id. at 505 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296).
66. As Professor Robert Post argues, these decisions reflect the first amendment's commitment to pluralism as well as to the individual's rights of expression. Post writes:
If the state were to enforce the civility rules of one community, say those of
Catholics, as against those of another, say Jehovah's Witnesses, the state would
in effect be using its power and authority to support some communities and
repress others. But the first amendment forbids the. state from doing this, in
order that "many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed."
Post, supra note 11, at 630 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310).
67. See Marshall, Establishment, supra note 14, at 530.
68. Smith, Symbols, supra note 25, at 310.
69. Cf. Lupu, supra note 56, at 987 ("IT]he most pervasive and debilitating form of
discouragement for religious exercise may well arise from
behavioral trends and patterns
in the society at large.").
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religious belief in particular." 70 For example, although it is certainly appropriate to be sensitive to the alienating effects that a public display of a
Christmas symbol might have on non-Christians, it is also true that during
the Christmas season, virtually every facet of the culture (television in
particular) is geared to the Christian holiday. The alienation that nonChristians may feel during Christmas is simply inevitable and will occur
71
with or without state-sponsored nativity scenes.
Religious sensibilities, in short, do not merit special deference under the
Constitution and cannot, in any event, possibly be shielded from offense
in a complex society. A special concern for religious sensibilities, therefore,
cannot explain the establishment clause decisions.

3.

The Offensiveness/Stigmatization Distinction

The most powerful argument distinguishing the treatment of offense in
Johnson from its treatment in Allegheny may be the contention that
Allegheny did not involve any offense. Even if, as a factual matter, some
observers of the creche were offended, the protection of persons from that
offense need not be the crux of the establishment claim. The claim, rather,
could be that the endorsement of one religious class 72 stigmatizes those who
are not endorsed.
If this is indeed the nature of the claim, 73 it possesses a strong historical
pedigree. The roots of the assertion that governmental action may be
70. Smith, Symbols, supra note 25, at 313.
71. Focusing upon the alienation caused by public displays of creches or crosses may miss
the mark in another respect. Certainly when the symbols of church and state are intertwined,
a peculiarly strong message is sent. On the other hand, the group whose impressionability has
been most strongly considered in establishment analysis has been children. Yet, it is highly
questionable whether children are sophisticated enough to realize the difference between the
symbolism of a state-sponsored nativity scene and pervasive Christmas television programming
and commercials.
72. The term class is used here rather than group or sect in order to reflect that establishment
violations may occur when the state favors religion over non-religion as well as when the state
engages in some sort of denominational preference. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
73. This may be what is meant by the language in Allegheny which indicates that what is
improper about endorsement is that it makes the non-favored group "feel like outsiders."
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3102; id. at 3118 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
The principle that the non-endorsed group should not be made to feel like outsiders has
sometimes been characterized as an effort to protect the "political standing" of the religious
group by assuring that religious groups are not alienated from the political community and
the political process. See Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of
-Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 41 DE PAUL L. REv
53 (1990); Conkle, supra note 56, at 1166-69, 1176-79. The term "political standing" is
somewhat of a misnomer since endorsement creates no actual political disability for the
disfavored group. Rather, the political standing argument focuses on the political-sociological
effects that may occur when groups feel alienated from the political community. As discussed
previously, however, religious alienation in a complex society is inevitable. See supra notes 6871 and accompanying text. For a more general critique of the political standing argument, see
Smith, Symbols, supra note 25, at 305-09.
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unconstitutional if it stigmatizes a disfavored group may be traced at least
as far back as 1879 when the Court in Strauder v West Virginia7 4 held that
a state could not "imply inferiorit[y]." 71 This stigmatization claim reached
its greatest fruition in Brown v Board of Education.76 In striking down
segregated schooling, the Brown Court relied in part on the proposition
that "[t]o separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
'77
unlikely ever to be undone.
Strauder and Brown, of course, are equal protection and not establishment
decisions. The difficulty with explaining Allegheny as a stigma case, however, lies not in the designation of the relevant clause 78 but in that any
harm that did occur to the non-endorsed group did not rise to a constitutionally cognizable level of stigmatization-at least as that concept has been
applied in the equal protection context.
As the equal protection decisions demonstrate, stigma is not created by
every line drawn on an ethnic, racial or religious basis. 79 Rather, there are
two components to a constitutionally cognizable stigmatic injury First, the
classification drawn must be pejorative of the group claiming stigmatic
injury Second, there must be a harm in addition to the psychological
affront for the stigma to become constitutionally cognizable. Both of these
components were satisfied in Strauder and Brown. Jury exclusion and
segregated schooling both implied black inferiority and produced tangible
effects on blacks.
On the other hand, cognizable stigma does not result from lines drawn
by government in which no pejorative message exists. For example, according to the Court, a legislative gerrymand designed to benefit blacks does

74. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
75. Id. at 308.
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. Id. at 494. Needless to say, Brown was not solely concerned with stigma. For a
discussion of the stigma concern as the focus of the attempt to integrate public education
prior to Brown, see Entin, Sweatt v. Painter, The End of Segregation, and the Transformation
of Education Law, 5 REv LITIG. 3, 54-56 (1986).

78. There is probably a fair argument to be made that the establishment clause as well as
the equal protection clause might be concerned with stigmatization. Certainly, the establishment
clause, like the equal protection clause, is concerned with equality issues. See Lupu, supra
note 56, at 982. For example, the establishment concern with prohibiting sect preference is, in
part, an equality principle. Id. Moreover, there may be a thematic as well as a legal consistency
between the two clauses. As previously noted, it may be that in a thematic sense, Brown was
the true ancestor of the school prayer cases rather than the establishment clause. See Marshall,
Establishment, supra note 14, at 531 n.214.
79. Even lines drafted specifically to aid a particular group do not per se stigmatize those
not receiving favorable treatment. See United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977)
(upholding legislative gerrymandering to benefit blacks in part because the plan "represented
no slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race").
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not raise stigma concerns because it represents no "slur" with respect to
other groups. 0 Similarly, feelings of stigma alone are not sufficient to create
a constitutional violation without additional harm. "Symbolic" affront
alone does not create a constitutional violation."
This understanding of constitutionally cognizable stigma informs the
analysis in Allegheny. As previously demonstrated, the premise that the
display of a creche favors Christianity is not per se dispositive. A favorable
statement about one class is not necessarily a correlative pejorative remark
about another class. For example, the statement "I endorse the Irish"
clearly suggests a preference. It does not, however, indicate that the speaker
believes that those not Irish are a stereotypically inferior race. As Professor
Burke Marshall has noted, there is a significant difference in the connota82
tions created by inclusions and exclusions.
The problem is in determimng which classifications are inclusionary or
exclusionary. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that not all classifications purportedly drawn on inclusionary lines are necessarily bemgn. An
all-white orgamzation, for example, may be more accurately characterized
as exclusionary rather than inclusionary. How then is a creche at city hall
to be interpreted? On one side, the creche arguably celebrates Christmas
and holds no pejorative connotation. On the other, the creche is a symbol
of the dominant religious tradition that sends a negative message to religious
minorities.83
However, even if the creche is construed as pejorative to non-Christians,
it would not produce cogmzable stigma under equal protection pnnciples.
The claim that the creche creates a constitutionally cogmzable stigma fails
to satisfy the equal protection clause's second requirement-that the group
demonstrate more than a psychological affront. Unlike the excluded classes
in Strauder and Brown, the group that the creche purportedly stigmatizes
suffers no other adverse effect.8 4 Thus, "outsiders" observing the creche,
like the blacks observing Alabama's Confederate flag, cannot demonstrate
cogmzable stigma.8"

80. Id.
81. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128 (1981); Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1562. Indeed,
an equal protection claim alleging stigma created solely by psychological affront may not even
constitute a sufficiently cognizable injury to satisfy the case or controversy requirements of
article IIl. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-66 (1984).
The Memphis case addressed a thirteenth amendment "badges of slavery" allegation rather

than a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim. Memphis, 451 U.S. at 124.

82. Marshall, A Comment on the NondiscriminationPrinciplein a "Nation of Minorities,"
93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1012 (1984).
83. For an analysis of some of the line-drawing problems in determining when classifications
are pejorative, see Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw U.L. REv
68, 89-91, 94 (1986) [hereinafter Marshall, Discrimination].

84. See Smith, Symbols, supra note 25, at 307-13.
85. See Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1562.
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At least two objections could be raised at this point. First, the equal
protection comparison is arguably inappropriate, and a lesser degree of
stigma probably should be required to show a constitutional violation under
the establishment clause. The basis of such an argument, however, would
be difficult to discern. The constitutional text does not help. Although both
establishment and equal protection are mentioned in the Constitution,
neither clause has language that explicitly addresses stigma. More fundamentally, the notion that the Constitution should be construed to redress
more religious discnmination than racial discrimination is misplaced. The
Constitution subjects both racial and religious classifications to equally strict

scrutiny

86

Second, it might be argued that equal protection jurisprudence is wrong,
and that a showing of psychological affront per se should trigger constitutional inquiry Yet, while it is true that cases like the Confederate flag
example are undoubtedly harsh, it is also true that psychological harm in
this context may be too amorphous a concept to be a constitutionally
workable construct.8 7 Should the New Hampshire motto "Live Free or Die"
be found unconstitutional because it implicitly attacks religious beliefs in
non-violence? Should aid to South Africa be unconstitutional because it
offends blacks? Again, the problem is that no workable construct can
eliminate offense to individual sensibilities in a diverse culture."8
Furthermore, the proposition that psychological affront per se should
trigger constitutional concern creates extraordinarily difficult line-drawing
problems. As with the creche example, determimng what is, and what is
not, pejorative is extremely difficult in the abstract. The conclusion that a
classification is pejorative, however, is much easier to maintain (and much
more meaningful) when it is shown that a tangible disability attaches to the
classification.
The attempt to reconcile Allegheny and Johnson on stigma grounds,
therefore, ultimately fails. Allegheny's contention that the Constitution
protects observers from symbolic alienation conflicts with Johnson's conclusion that the Constitution prevents the state from protecting individuals
from offense.
C.

Offense and Free Exercise

The Court's recent decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v Smith, 9 which held that free exercise protection does

86. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) (describing both race
and religion as classifications entitled to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny).
87. See Marshall, Discrimination, supra note 83, at 96; cf. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755-56.
88. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
89. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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not apply to neutral criminal laws of general applicability, has seriously cut
back on the scope of free exercise claims. 9° Nevertheless, even before Smith,
the role of offense in free exercise analysis was necessarily limited if only
because some governmental offense to religious sensibilities is inevitable. 91
Through its leadership position and high visibility, the government will
invariably affect religious (or non-religious) beliefs simply by taking a stand
on a particular issue.9 2 Accordingly, the claim that the government adopted
a position in derogation of an individual's religious beliefs has generally
not been found to trigger free exercise protection. As Professor Ira Lupu
has stated, "Those committed on religious grounds to pacifism or to an
anti-abortion stance cannot make legally cognizable claims that their rights
under the free exercise clause are burdened by state policies concerning war
or human reproduction that they find reprehensible." 93 Such claims, termed
by Lupu as "atmospheric burdens," are not legally cognizable under the
free exercise clause. 94
1. The Case of Public School Curricula
There exists at least one context in which exposure to ideas that are
hostile to one's religious beliefs may rise to a level that is more than simply
atmospheric. This context involves the public school and its effects on the
rights of parents to direct the education of their children. 95 The combination
of mandatory attendance and an active educational mission distinguishes
the public school environment from other governmental stimuli that are
offensive to religious sensibilities. 96 For this reason, it is not surprising that
the public school context has presented the most significant free exercise
attacks on governmental dissemination of ideas.

90. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1595; see also supra note 20.
91. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
92. See T. ARNOLD, Tim SYMBOLS OF GovERamErr (1935); M. EDELMAN, Tim SYMBOLIC
USES OF PowER 105-27 (1964); Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in RELIGION iN AMERICA
(1968); Lupu, supra note 56, at 964. For an analysis of the role of Court and Constitution in
influencing our societal values, see Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion,
1979 Sup. CT. REv. 123; Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290
(1937).
93. Lupu, supra note 56, at 987-88.
94. Id. at 987. Lupu suggests that the establishment clause may serve as a remedy for
some forms of atmospheric burdens. Although he does not explain this position in detail, the
tenor of his remarks suggests that he would probably disagree with the position taken in this
Article on the establishment issue. Id. at 987-89.
95. The right of parents to direct the educational upbringing of their children, although
recharacterized as being a "hybrid" due process/free exercise right, appears to be left intact
by the Smith decision. See supra note 20.
96. M. YunoF, supra note 43, at 213-14; Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 864, 891-92 (1988).
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The leading case is Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education.97 In
Mozert, the Sixth Circuit was faced with a free exercise challenge posed by
Fundamentalist schoolchildren and parents involving certain required readings in the public school curriculum that were considered antagonistic to
Fundamentalist religious beliefs. The court denied the challenge, explicitly
rejecting the contention that "mere exposure to materials that offend one's
religious beliefs creates an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of
religion."98

Mozert has provoked considerable criticism.9 One attack is predicated on
the assertion that the court did not adequately consider that the students
were essentially a captive audience. As these critics have noted, even certain
speech decisions permit some limitations on expression in these circumstances
out of concern for the sensibilities of the listeners 1 0
The captive audience argument, however, suffers from a fundamental
flaw. This captive audience rationale has been used only as a justification
for state restrictions on freedom of expression." ° The doctrine has never
been utilized to hold offensive speech unconstitutional.0 2 Thus, although
some precedent suggests that speech in public schools may be restricted

97 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), might also be considered the leading decision in the area, particularly

since it vindicated the free exercise right.
Yoder, however, is not as helpful as Mozert for illustrating the free exercise/offense issue
for two reasons. First, the specific nature of the free exercise claim in Yoder was ambiguous.
The thrust of the lawsuit was that the forced assimilation of Amish children into the public
school system would threaten the viability of the Amish community. Yet, the case is unclear
whether the threat of assimilation .would be caused by exposure to alien ideas or by the
socialization that invariably occurs in the public school setting.
Second, Yoder is arguably so tied to its facts that it lacks significant precedential value.
The Court emphasized that "few other religious groups or sects" would be entitled to similar
relief. Id., see also Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism" Proposed
Standardsfor Reviewing CurricularDecisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 Omo
ST. L.J. 335, 375 (1986).
98. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067
99. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 96; Ingber, supra note 56, at 294-304; Lupu, supra note
56; Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U.L. REv. 603,
613-14 (1987); Strossen, supra note 97, at 397-402; Note, Developments in the Law-Religion
and the State, 100 HAv L. REv 1606, 1665-74 (1987).
100. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (the Court found
that the city could "limit[] access to transit system advertising space in order to minimize
the risk of imposing on a captive audience"); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(upholding broadcast indecency restrictions on grounds of intrusion of airwaves into private
homes).
101. See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
102. See, e.g., Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 463 (1952) (rejecting the
claim of public bus riders that, as a captive audience, the first amendment protected their
rights "to listen only to such points of view as the listener wishes to hear"). But cf. M.
YUD~OF, supra note 43, at 170 (The captive-audience phenomenon standing alone, would not
give rise to a finding of unconstitutional governmental expression, but it may be decisive in
combination with other factors.).
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because of concern for listener sensibilities, there never has been a suggestion
that the Constitution requires the elimnation of that speech. For example,
013
Bethel School District v. Fraser'
held that the state could punish students
who presented sexually suggestive speeches. Fraser,however, did not suggest
that allowing such speech to exist would be constitutionally suspect. 104
Mozert has also been attacked on the grounds that the special atmosphere
within the public school environment warrants special concern for the
sensibilities of public school students. Professor George Dent has strongly
asserted that while in the outside world "[m]ost governmental messages
must compete with other messages and can be ignored or disbelieved with
impunity[,] in public schools ... not only must children listen to school
doctrine exclusively, but they also must learn and accept that doctrine."'10
Dent's conclusion that public schools require acceptance of specific teachings
is debatable. Students are obviously free to reject the propositions that
cheating is bad, free market economics is good, dropping the atomic bomb
was wise or that two plus two equals four. The remainder of Dent's
argument, however, is more forceftil. Schools do create a peculiarly intensive
environment.10 6 In such circumstances, distinguishing between mere exposure
and inculcation is highly problematic.is 7 Teaching, after all, involves an
attempt to influence by exposing individuals to ideas.
The argument that the public school environment warrants special constitutional concern for student sensibilities, however, ultimately proves too
much. First, it does not distinguish between religious, moral, political,
social, ethnic or racial sensibilities, thereby rendering everything taught in
the public schools constitutionally suspect. 08 The teaching of free market
economics, modem art, the history of slavery or reproductive technology

103. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
104. Even if the captive audience argument were accepted as a grounds for directly proscribing speech in some circumstances, it would not make sense to apply that doctrine to issues
involving public school curricula. As noted below, some offense to students' belief systems is
unavoidable if only because of the diversity in the public school student body. Voiding curcula
requirements because of captive audience concerns, therefore, endangers the entire public
school enterprise. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
105. Dent, supra note 96, at 892.
106. Perhaps because of its awareness that the public schools create a peculiarly intensive
environment, the Court has applied the establishment clause more stnngently in that context
than in any other area. Compare Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking down the
display of the Ten Commandments in public schools) and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(striking down school prayer) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a city
display of a nativity scene) and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative
prayer).
107. Dent, supra note 96, at 892-93. The Court itself has acknowledged that the function
of the public school is at least in part an attempt to instill values. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at
681 (the purpose of public schools is to instill values); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 7677 (1979) (same); Note, supra note 99, at 1671-72 (same).
108. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 56, at 303 (citing McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurrng)).
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may offend some students' political, religious, moral or ethmc sensibilities.
Second, even a rule limiting cognizable claims to those involving offense
to religious sensibilities would prove problematic.'0 9 As Professor Nadine
Strossen points out, "A public school curriculum which had to eliminate
any idea that collided
with any arguably religious belief would contain
few, if any, ideas."" 0 A rule protecting student sensibilities, in short, is
unworkable.
Moreover, any free exercise claim seeking to limit the exchange of
offensive ideas in public schools because of offense to student sensibilities
will necessarily conflict with the line of case authority which suggests such
efforts may violate the speech and establishment clauses. In Epperson v
Arkansas,"' for example, the Court addressed a state law prohibiting the
teaching of evolution in public schools. Because such a statute could
arguably mimmize offense in this highly charged topic, it might be considered constitutionally required if the rationale of protecting religious sensibilities were taken seriously The Epperson Court, however, held the statute
2
void under the establishment clause."
Admittedly, Epperson can be distinguished on grounds that the purpose
underlying the statute was not so beneficent." 3 Nevertheless, with some
exception for vulgarity or sexually suggestive speech," 4 the theme that the
public schools may not insulate students from controversial ideas is a part
of speech clause doctrine. In Board of Education v Pico,"5 for example,
the Court held that a school may not remove certain books from the school
library on the grounds that those books offended some students. Similarly,
in Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District,",, the
Court held that, as long as there was no disruption to the educational
process, the state could not proscribe the wearing of black arm bands by

109. Granting relief solely to those offended on religious grounds raises its own set of
problems. First, it requires courts to engage in sensitive inquiries into definitions of religion
and sincerity of religious belief. As has been frequently noted, these inquines themselves pose
serious threat to religious values because they essentially ask courts to validate particular types
of beliefs. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 56, at 241.
The claim that religious belief systems are constitutionally entitled to special deference over
non-religious belief systems becomes constitutionally controversial when the claim suggests a
priority of one type of belief system over another. The establishment of such a hierarchy,
however, would arguably conflict with the first amendment's commitment to the principle of
the equality of ideas. See Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W REs. L. REv 357 (1989-1990).
110. Strossen, supra note 97, at 375.
111. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
112. Id. at 107-09.
113. According to the Epperson Court, the legislative purpose underlying the statute was to
establish Fundamentalist beliefs. Accordingly, the Court struck down the statute on improper
purpose grounds. Id.
114. See Fraser, 478 U.S. 675.
115. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
116. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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some students even though the arm bands might offend others. These
decisions suggest that any rule attempting
to shield student sensibilities rests
117
on tenuous constitutional grounds.
Thus far, the free exercise claim at issue in the public school curricula
cases has been characterized as an objection to exposure to offensive ideas.
A stronger free exercise claim is possible. For some believers, exposure to
antagonistic ideas may more than merely offend; exposure may actually
conflict with a specific religious obligation to avoid exposure to offensive
ideas."' Assume such a case in which a student claims that reading materials
which suggest that moral principles may be derived from non-theistic sources
violates a tenet of her religion. On this basis, the student claims that she
should not be required to read an assigned book which she believes advances
this "humanistic" philosophy 119
How should this claim be resolved?
If the compelling interest test is utilized, the resolution of this claim will
likely turn on how the state interest is characterized. The state will probably
prevail if its interest is characterized as educational necessity: (1) "[s]chools
cannot avoid instilling values,"' 20 (2) schools must teach students "basic
concepts of social and political equality and 'tolerance of divergent political
and religious views' that are "at the heart of a democratic, pluralistic
society ' 121 or (3) schools cannot be burdened with the costs of admnistering
public education that accommodates every religious view.' 22 On the other
hand, if the state interest is characterized as either the need to have the
student read the particular book in questioniu or as merely developing
student competency in reading and writing, a court might vindicate the free
exercise claim and allow the student to opt out of the curriculum requirements.'24
The appropriate resolution of this case, however, may lie in the first
amendment itself, without regard for the determination of the relevant state
interest. Specifically, the constitutional commitment to tolerance that underlies first amendment jurisprudence may provide a solution. This aspect

117. It should be emphasized that the public school cases do not rest on the right of private
speakers to engage in offensive expression. While Tinker fits that model, both Pico and

Epperson involved the impernissibility of state efforts to limit its own "speech," that is, the
display of offensive books in Pico and the teaching of evolution in Epperson.

118. Mozert itself has been criticized for not characterizing the plaintiffs' claim in this
manner. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1075, 1078 (Boggs, J., concurring).
119.
1528.
120.
121.
122.
123.

The facts of this hypothetical are loosely fashioned after those in Grove, 753 F.2d
Ingber, supra note 56, at 303.
Note, supra note 99, at 1671-72 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681).
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1078-80.
Cf. Grove, 753 F.2d 1528 (the school allowed the student to opt out from reading the

book in controversy).
124. Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (Anish children were exempt from compulsory formal
education requirements after the eighth grade due to the overriding right to the free exercise
of religious beliefs).
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of first amendment jurisprudence and its relationship to the public school

curricula issue deserves a separate, if brief, discussion.
2.

The First Amendment's Requirement of Tolerance

It has.long been argued that freedom of speech encompasses more than
a protection for individual freedoms. By protecting expressive activities, the

first amendment also serves society's need for preserving the political debate
necessary to further self-governance and/or assuring an open "marketplace

of ideas" in which the search for truth might be accomplished.1 2 More
recently, however, the work of Dean Lee Bollinger has focused upon the

first amendment's commitment to another social value-tolerance.'

26

As Bollinger indicates, the commitment to tolerance has two facets. The

first and most obvious is that controversial speakers should be unrestricted
in their expression. The second is the implicit demand that "listeners remain

opennnded. '1

27

As Bollinger writes, "free speech is not concerned exclu-

sively with the preservation of a freedom to do whatever we wish, or with

the advancement of truth or of democracy as those terms are generally
used, but with the development of a capacity of rmnd."128 The first amendment's requirement of toleration conditions the manner in which society
will respond to matters it finds alien and offensive. It teaches society that

it must not censor offensive stimuli.

29

Bollinger's thesis may or may not succeed in presenting an overarching

understanding of the first amendment. 30 Yet, even if the speech clause
cannot be explained solely in terms of the promotion of toleration, there is
little question that Bollinger has identified one of the driving considerations
underlying the first amendment's commitment to offensive speech.' 3'
125. A. MEacLmom, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (selfgovernance); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(marketplace of ideas); see also Durchslag, Misuse of Separation of Power Theory in Cases
Outside the System of Freedom of Expression, 38 CAsE W Rs. L. REv. 496 (1988); Fiss,

Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv 1405 (1986).
126. Toleration is not always salutary. Bollinger notes that passiveness in the face of the
dissemination of hate, for example, may amount to "vicarious aggression." L. BOLLINOER,
supra note 12, at 233. Indeed, Bollinger also suggests that intolerance may, in certain
circumstances, be an appropriate response to particularly abhorrent messages. Id. at 61-63;
see also Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REv 963, 978 (1987).
127. Rosenfeld, Extremist Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance (Book Review), 100 HARv
L. REv 1457, 1459 (1987) (emphasis in original) (reviewing L. BOLLINGER, supra note 12); L.
BOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 142-44.
128. L. BOLLINOER, supra note 12, at 142.
129. Id. at 140-44.
130. See Sherry, supra note 126, at 982; Strauss, Why Be Tolerant? (Book Review), 53 U.
Cm. L. REv 1485, 1497 (1986) (reviewing L. BOLLINGER, supra note 12).
131. Strauss, supra note 130, at 1493 (BoUinger's theory, unlike conventional theories of
the first amendment, does not treat toleration of offensive speech as a necessary evil; rather,
his theory treats it as a valuable good because of its educative effects.).
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Bollinger's thesis is also informative in another respect. By focusing on
the duty of the listener, he implicitly provides a theoretical construct from
which to evaluate the constitutional claims of listeners who allege that they
are entitled to be free from offense. Although Bollinger himself does not
take the point this far, his focus on the listener suggests that freedom of
speech, and particularly the freedom to engage in offensive speech, possesses
its own regulating aspect. It imposes, in effect, a constitutional requirement
upon the citizenry to be tolerant.
Given that the concern for tolerance underlies the religion clauses as well
as the speech clause'3 2 the realization that the first amendment imposes a
duty to be tolerant obviously has a significant impact on the hypothetical
free exercise claim posed above. It suggests that a "right" to be free from
offense is fundamentally antithetical to the first amendment. It suggests in
effect that there exists no cognizable right to be free from offense under
any clause of the first amendment. Under such an approach, therefore, the
hypothetical free exercise claimant must lose because he has failed to present
any cognizable first amendment interest.
III.

THE EFFECTS OF REMOVING THE OFFENSIVENESS COMPONENT
FROM RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

As the preceding discussion indicates, the treatment of offensiveness in
current religion clause jurisprudence is inconsistent with the case law and
theory underlying the speech clause. Religion clause jurisprudence neither
explains this anomaly nor supports the contention that special treatment for
offense to religious sensibilities is mandated. Unless the speech clause
doctrine is discredited,' 33 this inconsistency should be resolved in favor of
the speech clause, and the concern with offense contained in the current
religion clause doctrine should be abandoned.
Many of the effects occasioned by altering the religion clause in this
manner have been noted throughout this Article. This Part reviews the most
significant implications of removing the offensiveness component from both
establishment and free exercise doctrines and discusses the application of
speech clause principles to religion clause litigation.

132. See, e.g., D. Ricaxiws, TOLERATION AND THE CONsTIuTION (1986). Bollinger himself,
however, does not advocate that his understanding applies to religion clause issues. L.
BOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 187-88.
133. As noted previously, there is currently much academic debate arguing in favor of
modifying the speech clause doctrine to reflect a greater concern for individual sensibilities.
See supra note i1 and authorities cited therein. The softening of the protection for offensive
speech might, for example, lead to upholding more restrictions on racist and sexist speech.
Such an approach would also lead to greater limits on governmental speech and could include,
for example, reversing the recent Eleventh Circuit case upholding Alabama's flying of the
Confederate flag. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990).
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Establishment Clause Implications

The exclusion of offensiveness as a consideration in establishment analysis
has two major implications. First, it reinforces-the notion that the harm of
establishment is not tied to its effects upon outsiders. 3 4 Governmental
actions that improperly endorse religion are unconstitutional per se. It is
the government's message that is critical, not the effects of that message.'
The display of a religious symbol, for example, is unconstitutional if it
improperly endorses religion, regardless of its effects on observers' sensibilities. Non-Christians, therefore, have no greater or lesser claim than do
Christians that the state has improperly endorsed Christianity by displaying
13 6
a cross, creche or other such symbol.
Second, and related to the first implication, the realization that offense
is not a part of the establishment clause claim suggests that the Court has
misconceived its endorsement test by examining the effects of the government's message on observers. 3 7 This misconception has led the Court to
focus on protecting persons from alienation rather than exammng the
endorsement itself. The offensiveness issue garbles the establishment inquiry
and improvidently suggests that establishment themes are inconsistent with
the protections of the speech clause.

134. Compare, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-73 (1975) (counseling and training
services by public employees on parochial school grounds creates impermissible church-state
entanglement) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1977) (state therapeutic and
counseling services are constitutional when they do not take place on parochial school grounds).
The distinction between Meek and Wolman could only depend on the symbolic significance
of the place in which the parochial aid was administered. The financial injury to taxpayers
would presumably remain constant in both cases. But see Smith, Symbols, supra note 25
(arguing endorsement is not a harm per se).
135. See supra note 134. For other examples indicating that it is the form of the message
and not its effects on outsiders that forms the core of the establishment claim, see Marshall,
Establishment, supra note 14, at 530-31.
136. Incidentally, this conclusion should not affect issues of standing, even though in most
circumstances, the Court has required a showing of injury by an individual in order to satisfy
justiciability requirements. The requirement of particularized injury has always been relaxed
in the establishment area, perhaps because of the implicit recognition of the point just asserted,
that establishment is an injury to the community, not to the individual. This does not mean
that there are no standing limitations restricting establishment claims. The mere claim that the
government has acted unlawfully may not satisfy the standing requirements in an establishment
case. Compare Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 486-87 (1982) (the argument that an asserted establishment clause
violation possesses a "spiritual stake" significant to confer standing held not to constitute an
injury sufficient for standing claims) with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing
denied because the injury alleged was not fairly traceable to the challenged unlawful governmental conduct).
137. This focus on the effect of the message sent may have been precipitated by Justice
O'Connor's suggestion that the question of whether a particular action endorses religion should
be determined from the perspective of a so-called "objective observer." Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. Free Exercise Clause Implications
The conclusion that offense is not cognizable as a component of a free
exercise claim is also significant. First, it suggests that the Sixth Circuit
properly decided Mozert'38 when it suggested that merely being exposed to
opposing religious views did not constitute a free exercise violation. Even
if the Mozert court discounted too quickly the intensive educational atmosphere of the public school, 3 9 the court's conclusion that no burden on free
exercise rights existed is correct. Exposure to offensive ideas does not
implicate constitutional concerns.
The free exercise issue becomes more complex if the constitutional claimant argues that her objection to exposure to offensive ideas is grounded in
a religious tenet or obligation. However, even in this extreme instance, the
free exercise claim should not prevail. The recognition that the first amendment requires tolerance indicates that such a free exercise claim is simply
,not cognizable' 4' because the claimed "right" to be free from offense
conflicts with the first amendment itself.
C.

Implicationsfor Religion Clause Litigation

Finally, while not a theoretical or a doctrinal concern, another lesson can
be learned from the first amendment's commitment to tolerance. The force
of Bollinger's writing lies in his conclusion that individuals benefit by
rejecting their impulses to censor whatever they find offensive. Exposure to
offensive ideas develops capacities of self-restraint that benefit the individual
4
and the social order in general.' '

Toleration also produces a second benefit. It avoids the snowball effects
of intolerance, and especially, the tendency for intolerance to breed and
legitimize the intolerance of others. When one faction of the society attempts
to censor another faction's ideas, those targeted frequently retaliate by
seeking censorship. When intolerant responses to offensive stimuli are
considered acceptable in one context, they are often employed in another.
These problems, moreover, become exacerbated by judicial involvement.
When courts uphold intolerant responses to offensive stimuli, intolerance is
42
legitimated as an appropriate means of response.
Against this background, recent events in both establishment and free
exercise jurisprudence are troubling. An unfortunate pattern of litigation

138. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
139. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
141. L. BOLUNGER, supra note 12, at 113-19, 131-43.
142. See id. at 99; Rosenfeld, supra note 127, at 1463-64.
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has engulfed the religion clause debate. Divergent and often opposing groups
seem intent on prohibiting what they deem offensive and have selected the
religion clauses as their weapon of choice. Lawsuits attacking "humanist"
textbooks, Christmas carols, football game invocations, graduation
convocations, nativity scenes and the National Endowment for the Arts are
41 3
just a few of the lawsuits that have been brought by credible orgamzations.
Somewhere in all this litigiousness, toleration has been lost and, unfortunately, serious religious divisiveness now exists-in part because of the
types of cases discussed in this Article. 144 Certainly, legitimate establishment
and free exercise claims should be redressed. Governmental displays of
creches on public property may violate the establishment clause, and various
required readings in public school education may violate the free exercise
clause. These practices, however, should not be held unconstitutional solely
because they offend a particular group. Religion clause jurisprudence should
resist the temptation to still expression solely because it is provocative.
CONCLUSION

The theme of offensiveness permeates constitutional law It has not,
however, been treated consistently In some circumstances, the Court's
concern for individual sensibilities has justified constitutional relief. In other
instances, the Court has held that constitutional freedoms demand the
existence of a robust society in which offense to sensibilities is widespread
and commonplace.
The speech clause and religion clauses are paradigmatic examples in which
the constitutional treatment of offense conflicts. While the speech clause
jurisprudence minimizes the importance of protecting persons from offense,
current religion clause jurisprudence suggests that the protection of persons
from offense may rise to a constitutional requirement.
The comparison of the treatment of offense in the speech and religion
areas is not interesting solely because of its inconsistency Rather, examination of the offensiveness issue leads to the realization that the goal of

143. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (nativity scene);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (nativity scene); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist
Cir. 1990) (a benediction and invocation at a graduation and promotion ceremony); Jager v.
Douglas School Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.) (football game invocations), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 2431 (1989); Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058 ("humanist" textbooks); Grove v. Mead School
Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.) ("humanist" textbook), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985);
Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.) (a school Christmas carol
program), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); Fordyce v. Frohnmayer, No. 90-2106 (D.D.C.)
(complaint dated August 29, 1990) (National Endowment for the Arts); Society of Separationists
v. Clements, 677 F Supp. 509 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (a state employee sponsored a Christmas
carol program at the State Capital rotunda).
144. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that religious divisiveness
was created in the City of Pawtucket by the litigation surrounding the creche).
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tolerance, which underlies both clauses, may be served best by applying
speech pnnciples to religion clause issues. The dissemination of ideas, from
any source, should not be proscribed solely because it offends individual
sensibilities.

